The Consent Paradox: Accounting for the Prominent Role of Consent in Data Protection by Bergemann, Benjamin
www.ssoar.info
The Consent Paradox: Accounting for the
Prominent Role of Consent in Data Protection
Bergemann, Benjamin
Postprint / Postprint
Sammelwerksbeitrag / collection article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Bergemann, B. (2018). The Consent Paradox: Accounting for the Prominent Role of Consent in Data Protection. In M.
Hansen, E. Kosta, I. Nai-Fovino, & S. Fischer-Hübner (Eds.), Privacy and Identity Management: The Smart Revolution.
Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92925-5_8
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
econstor
Make Your Publications Visible.
A Service of
zbw Leibniz-InformationszentrumWirtschaftLeibniz Information Centrefor Economics
Bergemann, Benjamin
Book Part  —  Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)
The Consent Paradox: Accounting for the Prominent
Role of Consent in Data Protection
Provided in Cooperation with:
WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Suggested Citation: Bergemann, Benjamin (2018) : The Consent Paradox: Accounting for the
Prominent Role of Consent in Data Protection, In: Hansen, Marit Kosta, Eleni Nai-Fovino, Igor
Fischer-Hübner, Simone (Ed.): Privacy and Identity Management. The Smart Revolution, ISBN
978-3-319-92925-5, Cham, Springer International Publishing, pp. 111-131,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92925-5_8
This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/180107
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen
Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle
Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich
machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.
Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen
(insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten,
gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort
genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your
personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them
publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise
use the documents in public.
If the documents have been made available under an Open
Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you
may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated
licence.
www.econstor.eu
The Consent Paradox: Accounting for the Prominent Role 
of Consent in Data Protection 
by 
Benjamin Bergemann 
WZB Berlin Social Science Center  
benjamin.bergemann@wzb.eu 
Accepted and published as: Bergemann, Benjamin. 2018. “The Consent Paradox: Accounting for the Prominent 
Role of Consent in Data Protection.” In Privacy and Identity Management. The Smart Revolution, edited by Marit 
Hansen, Eleni Kosta, Igor Nai-Fovino, and Simone Fischer-Hübner, 526:111–31. Cham: Springer International 
Publishing. 
The ﬁnal publication is available at Springer 
via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92925-5_8 
Abstract. The concept of consent is a central pillar of data protection. It 
features prominently in research, regulation, and public debates on the 
subject, in spite of the wide-ranging criticisms that have been levelled 
against it. In this paper, I refer to this as the consent paradox. I argue that 
consent continues to play a central role not despite but because the criti-
cisms of it. I analyze the debate on consent in the scholarly literature in 
general, and among German data protection professionals in particular, 
showing that it is a focus on the informed individual that keeps the con-
cept of consent in place. Critiques of consent based on the notion of “in-
formedness” reinforce the centrality of consent rather than calling it into 
question. They allude to a market view that foregrounds individual choice. 
Yet, the idea of a data market obscures more fundamental objections to 
consent, namely the individual’s dependency on data controllers’ services 
that renders the assumption of free choice a fiction. 
Keywords: Commodification · Data protection · Discourse analysis · In-
formed consent · Information control · Power. 
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1 Introduction: The Consent Paradox1 
Despite criticism, consent enjoys a massive and ongoing presence in data protec-
tion. I refer to this counterintuitive observation as the consent paradox. Consent is 
omnipresent in policy making, regulatory practice, and scholarly debates. Yet, the 
prominent role ascribed to consent in data protection is puzzling given the sus-
tained critique from data protection professionals and average users alike 
(Schermer, Custers, and van der Hof 2014, 171). Both groups argue that it is 
hard for users to comprehend what they are consenting to. Moreover, they criti-
cize that users often do not have a choice but to consent because they rely on 
products such as social network services or smartphones. In data protection par-
lance, lay people and specialists criticize that consent is, in many cases, neither 
informed nor freely given. Nevertheless, consent continues to be an essential part of 
data protection both in theory and practice. The aim of my paper is to account 
for this consent paradox: How is it that consent is ascribed such a prominent 
role in data protection while at the same time being subject to numerous criti-
cisms? 
I set out to explain the consent paradox in data protection by analyzing the 
nexus between criticizing consent and keeping it in place. In other words, I as-
sume that the consent paradox does not exist despite but due to the criticisms of 
consent. Thus, I do not discuss in how far consent is a meaningful instrument of 
data protection. Instead, I analyze how this very discussion makes consent a fit-
ting solution to today’s data protection problems. At first glance, assuming a 
productive, rather than a destructive relationship between critique and its object 
appears counter-intuitive. However, the idea is not unfamiliar in political sociol-
ogy (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, 27) and, more importantly, seems to tie in 
well with others’ observations regarding consent in data protection. 
Several scholars have repeatedly pointed to what I term a consent paradox. 
They emphasize that consent continues to be an essential part of data protection 
policies despite its perceived limits (see Austin 2014, 136; Zanfir 2014, 239; 
Koops 2014, 251). Koops, criticizing a “mythology of consent”, wonders why 
“the conclusion is too seldom drawn that consent is simply not a suitable ap-
proach to legitimate data processing in online contexts” (Koops 2014, 251). For 
Koops and others the consent paradox is manifested in the new General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), which, according to them, has a strong focus on 
consent and individual information control in general (see van der Sloot 2014, 
313). 
Some authors have already suggested a connection between criticizing consent 
and keeping it in place. Zanfir notes that the modifications made to consent in 
the GDPR “are responses to the critiques of the provisions in the [Data Protec-
tion Directive]” (Zanfir 2014, 241). Arguing in the same direction, Schermer et 
                                                     
1 This paper refines several arguments that I have developed in my master’s thesis (Bergemann 
2017). 
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al. state that “the crisis of consent” has led to regulatory attempts to reform con-
sent (Schermer, Custers, and van der Hof 2014, 172). A similar observation has 
been made by Barocas and Nissenbaum from an US perspective (Barocas and 
Nissenbaum 2014, 58). According to them, questioning consent prompts an 
“urgent need” to fix it. Elaborating further on the nexus between critique and 
reform, Rouvroy and Poullet suggest that certain kinds of critique can be ad-
dressed by reforming consent, while more fundamental objections, resulting 
from “socio-economic and other structural inequalities,” seem to question con-
sent in general (Rouvroy and Poullet 2009, 74). One issue with consent that falls 
into the former category of perceived ‘solvable’ problems is ensuring that indi-
viduals consent in an informed manner. As authors on both sides of the Atlantic 
observe, enhancing individual information provision seems to be the most 
common suggestion for mitigating the problems with consent (van der Sloot 
2014, 318; Rouvroy and Poullet 2009, 74; Crain 2016, 5; McDermott 2017, 3; 
Koops 2014, 252). 
Yet, the studies mentioned make these observations in the course of other ar-
guments, thus only touching upon the question I want to answer in this paper: 
How can we account for the prominent position of consent despite critique? To 
answer this question, I develop these arguments further, proceeding in two steps. 
I first review the scholarly critiques of consent. In a second step, I complement 
this literature review by analyzing the debate on consent among German data 
protection professionals between 2000 and today. 
Drawing on this analysis, I claim that it is the emphasis on informedness that 
keeps consent in place. Criticizing consent in terms of information asymmetries 
makes reforming consent not only a feasible but also a valuable project. As I will 
show in the following, this is because problematizing consent in terms of infor-
mation asymmetries goes along with the idea of seeing data protection through a 
market lens. From the data market viewpoint, consent is a key instrument for 
consumers to exchange “their data” in order to benefit from the services provid-
ed by internet companies. However, for the consumer to understand that she is 
benefiting from the transaction of “her data,” it must be clear to her what is in 
the deal. This ties the data market narrative to the legal requirement of informed 
consent, making it the yard stick for proper consent. The focus on informedness, 
I argue, comes at the expense of an understanding of data protection in terms of 
power. Approaching consent from the perspective of power asymmetries calls 
into question whether consent can be freely given, thus challenging the case for 
consent more profoundly. 
My contribution takes a discourse analytical perspective. It differs from most 
of the literature on consent in that it does not argue from a legal or philosophical 
standpoint. I try to show how the debate on consent in data protection, although 
being legal in nature, is shaped by greater societal debates and conflicts. My goal 
is to map the discussion on consent in data protection, to understand its inner 
workings and the effects it produces. One such effect, I suspect, is the consent 
paradox. 
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The paper is structured as follows. The second part introduces the consent 
approach in data protection and its respective critiques. Looking at the critical 
debate about consent as the assumed source of the consent paradox, I argue that 
a closer, more empirical, view is needed to understand how exactly criticizing 
consent leads to the consent paradox. Third, I briefly introduce discourse analy-
sis as my methodology. Then I present the debate on consent among German 
data protection professionals between 2000 and today as my object of analysis, 
explaining the case selection and the steps taken to come to my findings. The 
results are presented in section four. In the concluding section, I reflect on the 
implications of my argument for data protection research and practice. 
2 Consent in Data Protection and its Discontents 
The aim of this section is to present the basics of the consent debate in data pro-
tection and linking it to the idea of the consent paradox. In line with the scope of 
my paper, this section will focus on the literature about consent in data protec-
tion, excluding other important work on the role of consent, most notably in the 
medical field (Manson and O’Neill 2007; Laurie 2004).2 As the field of data pro-
tection is traditionally dominated by legal scholars (Bennett 2008, 76), I often 
refer to legal scholarship and documents. Yet, I do not provide a legal analysis of 
consent in data protection. 
2.1 The Consent Paradox in European Data Protection Law 
Legally speaking, consent is just one of the six legal grounds that authorize the 
processing of personal data in European data protection legislation (Zanfir 2014, 
237). This has been true since the 1995 Data Protection Directive (DPD) and 
has been continued in the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 
Here, consent is defined as “any freely given, specific, informed and unambigu-
ous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or 
by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal 
data relating to him or her” (art 4). There are other legal grounds to base pro-
cessing on, most importantly, the performance of a contract, legal provisions and 
the legitimate interest of the data controller. According to European data protec-
tion law, consent also does not change the fact that every data processing, re-
gardless of its legal basis, is “subject to ‘suitable safeguards’” (Zanfir 2014; see 
also Gutwirth 2012). As Zanfir (2014) describes, suitable safeguards encompass 
                                                     
2 Works on consent in the medical field have considerably influenced the academic debate on 
consent in data protection. Kosta (2013, 111) as well as Barocas and Nissenbaum (2014, 64) rely 
on arguments from the literature on consent in the medical field. From a discourse analytical 
perspective, linking two distinct fields is interesting in its own right. One could ask what impli-
cations such an analogy has for data protection and consent, in contrast to borrowing from 
other analogies such as the rule of law (Austin 2014). 
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the principle of purpose limitation, data subject’s rights and organizational and 
enforcement measures to hold data controllers accountable. In short, consent is 
always embedded in an environment of other data protection rules and princi-
ples. Yet, the degree to which data protection rules should focus on consent—in 
law as well as in practice—has been disputed among specialists. 
The new GDPR, as several authors have noted, keeps with the directive’s em-
phasis on consent, which is in line with my argument of a consent paradox (Zan-
fir 2014; van der Sloot 2014; Koops 2014; De Hert and Papakonstantinou 2016, 
187). Yet, Quelle (2016) has convincingly argued that consent’s and user con-
trol’s role in the GDPR is a matter of interpretation.3 What, however, speaks in 
favor of reading the GDPR in terms of a consent paradox is that it not only 
keeps with consent, but it does so through the process of reforming it. Most of 
those reforms address the requirements of freely given and informed consent.4 
The GDPR, in other words, speaks to the criticisms of consent that I will intro-
duce in the paragraphs ahead. 
Finally, I do not intend to imply that the GDPR is the only instance of the 
consent paradox. The preoccupation with consent and its improvement mani-
fests itself in research and development projects, campaigning and litigation ac-
tivities or privacy literacy efforts, just to name a few. Yet, legal instruments such 
as the GDPR are especially important since—on the one hand—they are a prod-
uct of professional and societal debates. On the other hand, they are also a guid-
ing source for new discussions, regarding laws’ interpretation and future reform. 
To better understand the consent paradox, the following section will turn from 
one of its empirical manifestations to one of its assumed sources: the critical 
debate about consent among specialists. 
2.2 Consent and its Critics: Neither Freely Given, nor Informed? 
Despite its stable and prestigious position in European data protection, consent 
has faced critique by practitioners and scholars alike. While criticisms of consent 
are as old as consent in data protection itself5, the last decade has seen an in-
creasing number of critical engagements with the consent approach, especially in 
academia. There are different ways to map this vast literature. In line with the 
                                                     
3 Lynskey provides an in-depth discussion of data protection law’s understanding of individual 
information control (Lynskey 2015). 
4 Discussing the reforms made to consent in the GDPR is outside the scope of this paper. They 
have been described elsewhere (Quelle 2016, 142; see De Hert and Papakonstantinou 2016, 9). 
5 Tellingly, it was only after a heated debate that the first German data protection act of 1977 in-
cluded consent as a legal ground for processing personal data. Early adopters of automatic data 
processing argued that only consent alone could provide for the legal certainty required to im-
plement the new means of data processing. Critics, on the other side, claimed that the consent 
provision would constitute a potential loophole, allowing data controllers to depart from stricter 
data protection obligations (von Uckermann 1979). 
6 
previous section, I will concentrate on those accounts that criticize consent re-
garding the requirements of freely given and informed consent.6 
Several voices doubt that there are many examples of freely given consent in 
practice. The practice they usually refer to is the use of notice and consent by digi-
tal platforms (see Koops 2014, 251). Here, they lament, the individual is not free 
to authorize the processing of her data for three major reasons. First, for the 
individual there is “little to no room for negotiation” (Schermer, Custers, and 
van der Hof 2014, 177) as she can only consent to standardized privacy policies 
(see also Austin 2014, 143). She is thus not expressing her free choice. She mere-
ly reacts to a “take it or leave it” deal. Second, the data subject often has no 
choice but to consent since they are no alternatives among the quasi-monopolies 
of internet platforms, let alone more data protection-friendly ones (Koops 2014, 
252). Third and related, users increasingly depend on the usage of digital plat-
forms (Matzner et al. 2016, 297), reflecting the fact that they became private 
infrastructures, necessary to exist in our digital societies. In sum, all three argu-
ments state that consent does not live up to its promise of free choice due to 
power imbalances between users and platforms. What sets these criticisms apart 
from the next line of arguments is that they consider power imbalances as dis-
tinct from information asymmetries. This implies that properly informing the 
data subject will not suffice to redress consent’s shortcomings (see Lynskey 2015, 
260). 
Among those critiques based on the notion of freely given consent, there is a 
general tendency to raise doubts about the reformability of consent, at least in 
the narrow sense proposed in the GDPR. Most contributions in this camp advo-
cate, although often rather vaguely, for regulating the behavior of data control-
lers to ensure the fairness of data processing (Schermer, Custers, and van der 
Hof 2014, 180; Austin 2014, 185; Matzner et al. 2016, 303; Koops 2014, 260). 
Focusing on controllers and their operations, they argue, would allow for reduc-
ing the burden the user. More specifically, Koops suggests relying on other legal 
grounds than consent in “online contexts” (Koops 2014, 252). Rhoen proposes 
to address power asymmetries between data subjects and controllers by evaluat-
ing “privacy contracts”, by which he means the legal grounds of both consent 
and contract, with the help of consumer law’s notion of “unfair terms” (Rhoen 
2016). He thus advocates to complement the “formal requirements” of data pro-
tection law with consumer law, regulating what can fairly be consented to by the 
consumer in the first place (Rhoen 2016, 5). However, the bigger point among 
those critics seems to be that the emphasis on consent should be reduced, which 
speaks against my hypothesis that the consent paradox stems from reforms in-
duced by consent’s critics. 
                                                     
6 This excludes several serious objections, for instance that, even under perfect conditions, consent 
cannot ensure privacy and data protection due to the technical possibility of making infer-
ences—even about those who do not disclose their data (Barocas and Nissenbaum 2014, 61; 
van der Sloot 2014, 322). 
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The second, and apparently more common, criticism of consent concerns its 
informedness. Again, I will focus on the three major lines of reasoning in the litera-
ture (Solove 2013; for comprehensive accounts see Schermer, Custers, and van 
der Hof 2014; Arnold, Hillebrand, and Waldburger 2015a). The first critique 
addresses the fact that most people do not read privacy policies (see Solove 
2013, 1883). The most often-cited reason for this is that reading privacy policies 
takes too long (“information overload) while at the same time there are too 
much of them (“consent overload”) (Schermer, Custers, and van der Hof 2014, 
177). The objective amount of time that would be needed to read, or even skim, 
the privacy policies presented to data subjects by far exceeds the time that can be 
reasonably expected to be invested by the average user (see Schermer, Custers, 
and van der Hof 2014, 177). Schermer et al. argue further that information and 
consent overload lead to “consent desensitization”, that is, people giving their 
consent blindly, thereby devaluing consent and lowering the level of data protec-
tion in the long term (Schermer, Custers, and van der Hof 2014, 178). A second 
line of objections raises doubts over the possibility of understanding privacy 
policies and data processing more generally. To begin with the latter, modern 
data processing operations in general are difficult to comprehend for the average 
data subject and the specialist alike (Solove 2013, 1888; Barocas and Nissenbaum 
2014, 59). As Solove points out, the same is true for the consequences caused by 
a lack of privacy/data protection as they often remain “abstract” (Solove 2013, 
1885). Privacy policies, in turn, need to translate these complexities ensuring 
informed consent.7 As a result, privacy policies turn out to be difficult to under-
stand. This is only aggravated by the highly standardized and often legalistic lan-
guage used in privacy policies (see Solove 2013, 1884). The problem with under-
standing privacy policies is often discussed in terms of a “transparency paradox” 
as Barocas and Nissenbaum put it (Barocas and Nissenbaum 2014, 58). While it 
seems obvious that privacy policies could be simplified to ease the users’ under-
standing, the loss of complexity necessarily involves a loss of information (see 
Koops 2014, 252; Solove 2013, 1886). Third and lastly, it is far from clear wheth-
er better information also leads to better decisions by data subjects. In fact, peo-
ple’s decision-making, is “skewed” (Solove 2013, 1886), since it is largely decou-
pled from the quality of information provided to them. Rather than by infor-
mation provisions, users are influenced by their own biases and the immediate 
context of their decisions, for example, what their perceived short-term gains are 
(see Acquisti et al. 2017, 6). 
The problem of how to improve the informedness of users has motivated 
numerous researchers and practitioners. Ideas on how to improve users’ ability 
                                                     
7 For a more general critique on this reduced understanding of how humans process information 
see Barocas and Nissenbaum (Barocas and Nissenbaum 2014, 64) who refer to Manson and 
O'Neill’s Rethinking informed consent in bioethics (Manson and O’Neill 2007). Manson and O'Neill 
provide an in-depth discussion of how human information processing works and the conse-
quences of these insights for informed consent. 
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to notice, read, understand and decide abound (for an overview see Arnold, Hil-
lebrand, and Waldburger 2015a). Most of them involve visualizing (images, 
icons) as well as simplifying and condensing information into different degrees 
of complexity. Often, this is combined with rating the privacy policies’ content 
(Arnold, Hillebrand, and Waldburger 2015a; Calo 2012). Rating can take the 
forms of warnings (mostly from third-parties) but also comes in more positive 
forms such as official labels and certificates where the quality of processing con-
ditions is granted by a certification authority (see Arnold, Hillebrand, and Wald-
burger 2015a, 39).8 Others seek to improve the user’s informedness by personal-
izing privacy policies and notices in accordance with her level of knowledge (see 
Arnold, Hillebrand, and Waldburger 2015a, 44). Last but not least, with the rise 
of behavioral research that brought to fore users’ irrational decision making, the 
idea of nudging people into better privacy decisions, for instance through design-
ing applications and small notices in particular ways, has gained credibility in 
recent years (see Acquisti et al. 2017, 16). Finally, it is important to note that the 
literature does not claim that improved information provisions will solve all of 
consent’s problems. Rather, it is regarded as a first step to reform (see Arnold, 
Hillebrand, and Waldburger 2015a, 62). 
Summing up the literature review, it becomes clear that criticizing the in-
formedness of consent is linked to a more profound interest in reforming con-
sent. Thus, criticizing consent in terms of informedness seems to re-emphasize 
rather than to call into question consent in data protection, which is in line with 
the consent paradox hypothesis. However, the evidence gained from the scholar-
ly accounts cannot explain the consent paradox satisfactorily. First, while the 
literature review can provide initial evidence for the consent paradox, it fails to 
account for the fact that criticizing consent in terms of information asymmetries 
appears more prominent than the objections regarding power asymmetries. What 
is it that makes the information camp’s arguments so compelling and amenable 
to the consent discussion? Second, foregrounding either freely given or informed 
consent, the critiques discussed do not explain how to—technically—deal with 
the fact that both requirements need to be fulfilled for consent to be lawful. An-
other legal-technical but important aspect that most criticisms of consent do not 
address, concerns the distinction between the legal grounds of consent and con-
tract. When criticizing consent, both EU and US authors often refer to a practice 
that is commonly known as “notice and consent” (agreeing in exchange for get-
ting a service on the internet) but that does not necessarily constitute consent in 
the sense of EU data protection law, since it could also be regarded as “necessary 
for the performance of a contract” from a controller’s perspective. Thus, what 
can be learned from the literature review is both too broad, omitting the legal 
complexities of consent, and too narrow, passing over the embeddedness of 
                                                     
8 Interestingly, procedural and substantial measures overlap in the latter case, situating certification 
approaches in-between so-called “paternalistic”, that is, organizational measures addressing the 
behavior of data controllers, and improving user choice. 
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these critiques in wider professional and societal discourses. The remainder of 
this paper seeks to address these two points by analyzing the consent paradox in 
a more empirical fashion, zooming into the consent debate among German data 
protection practitioners. 
3 Study and Methods: Analyzing the Consent Paradox 
through the Lens of German Data Protection Specialists 
3.1 Case Selection: The German Consent Debate 
To reconstruct the consent paradox in more detail, I conducted a discourse anal-
ysis of the consent debate among German data protection professionals between 
2000 and early 2017. Before discussing how this analysis can help to address the 
broader issue of the consent paradox, it should be noted that the rationale for 
this kind of analysis comes from political sociology, which assumes that profes-
sionals shape important political questions in their respective areas of expertise 
(see Kauppi and Madsen 2013). Thus, I assume data protection professionals and 
their debates influential for the development of consent and, consequently, 
worth analyzing. 
Why is it worth looking at German data protection specialists in particular? 
First, the German tradition of data protection, informational self-determination, 
and consent has been influential in data protection at the European level (Kosta 
2013, 54). Second, it can be argued that the German discussion on consent was 
shaped by European and international debates, and therefore reflects the wider 
debate on consent to some extent. The most notable example of this mutual 
influence is the development of the EU legal framework for data protection as it 
has developed over time. Further, perhaps less obvious examples include trans-
national discussions on topics such as the “economics of privacy” (Acquisti, 
Taylor, and Wagman 2016), a theme that has made its way into the German de-
bate in recent years. Third, the form of the German consent debate is distinct in 
that it has evolved as a hybrid of a scholarly, a societal, and a technical debate, 
involving academics, members of data protection authorities, and lawyers and 
data protection officers working in the private sector. However, I neither argue 
that the German debate has been decisive for the European field of data protec-
tion in general, nor do I claim that it merely reflects European or transnational 
developments. Rather, I want to demonstrate that the German debate, as a piece 
of the consent puzzle, can provide a useful starting point to understand the con-
sent paradox. In particular, I expect these discussions to provide a more nuanced 
perspective on the technical details of consent in data protection law, which, as I 
have argued above, are notably absent from the scholarly debate on consent. 
My analysis focuses on a period extending from the beginning of 2000 to 
March 2017. The research material consists of 27 written contributions to the 
consent debate, most of them taking the form of articles in professional journals 
10 
(n=23), some contributions to edited volumes (n=3), and one research report. 
Due to the time-consuming interpretative method used (see below), it was not 
possible to include entire monographs. 
The process of selecting these texts involved multiple stages. I first identified a 
series of influential, that is, frequently cited, articles on consent in data protection 
journals by compiling references from the authoritative legal commentary on the 
Germany Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG) (Simitis 2011, 432). In addition, I 
compiled all of the references from the literature review chapters of recent dis-
sertations on consent, assuming that they include the most important and recent 
work on the topic (Rogosch 2013; Hermstrüwer 2016). In a second step, I sys-
tematically searched a major German database9 as well as Google scholar for 
German-speaking articles on consent in data protection. This was necessary to 
avoid reproducing potential citation bias from the first round of selection.10 Af-
ter sorting out those articles that dealt primarily with consent in the medical field, 
I arrived at 92 texts, two-thirds of them from the period between 2000 and 
2017.11 The increasing number of articles on consent reflects a growing interest 
in the issue among data protection specialists since the turn of the millennium. 
This can be read as evidence of the consent paradox. Most of the articles pub-
lished since 2000 discuss the importance of consent in the dawning age of com-
mercial Internet usage and the associated business model of offering services in 
exchange for monetizing user data. As this discussion seems to be at the core of 
the consent debate, I decided to focus on these articles and exclude texts written 
before 200012. I further excluded the few texts since 2000 that dealt with consent 
in the offline world, for instance, in the case of loyalty programs (see Kosta 
2013, 195). This left a total of 37 articles for the document analysis. This number 
was further reduced to 27 in the process of interpretation, which I turn to in the 
following. 
3.2 Method: Making Sense of the Consent Debate with the Help 
of Discourse Analysis and Grounded Theory 
To analyze the material selected, I conducted a discourse analysis. Discourse analy-
sis does not rely on a prescribed theory or method, but rather denotes a meth-
odological standpoint. Discourse analysis encompasses different schools of 
thought, sharing the premise that reality is shaped by discourse. Discourse can be 
defined as “ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to 
                                                     
9 Database of the Berlin State Library: http://staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/en/.  
10 A likely citation bias in this case could consist of authors who do not cite each other because 
they belong to different schools of thought. 
11 The exact numbers of texts for the respective decades are: 1970s (n=9), 1980s (n=9), 1990s 
(n=13), 2000s (n=27), 2010s (n=34). 
12 I allowed for a tolerance of one year, assuming that a text published in 1999 was written around 
the turn of the millennium. 
11 
social and physical phenomena” (Hajer 2017). In short, discourses are knowledge 
orders, underlying arguments and debates. At the same time, discourses often 
come with certain narratives, which, as Gottweis put it, have the “power to cre-
ate order” (Gottweis 2006, 468). Thus, in discourse analysis, knowing and telling 
blend into each other. Even the most technical debates rely on certain views and 
assumptions to make sense of what they are doing. Most discourse analyses aim 
at identifying discourses in spoken and written language. The role of discourse in 
data protection has not been studied sufficiently in the research to date. A nota-
ble exception13 is Bennett and Raab’s argument that the field of data protection 
and privacy has been shaped by a discourse they call the “privacy paradigm,” 
which links actors’ “agreed understanding of the nature and the scope” of priva-
cy to the values of liberal democracy and the autonomous individual (Bennett 
and Raab 2003, 13). Bennett and Raab have shown that these assumptions are 
not merely rhetoric but have substantial and wide-ranging implications, including 
the focus on personal data in data protection law (Bennett and Raab 2003, 16). 
Applying discourse analysis to a complex legal issue such as data protection 
involves going beyond the analysis of law itself. As Klein et al. argue in the area 
of copyright law, legal arguments rely on non-legal justifications that in turn are 
connected to broader narratives, making them appear as compelling arguments 
(Klein, Moss, and Edwards 2015). It is important to note that competing justifi-
cations or discourses are often rooted in fundamentally different understandings 
of what is “good, right, and just” (Klein, Moss, and Edwards 2015, 4). This also 
implies that there can be no single understanding of, in our case, data protection 
or their respective aims. Rather, there are different and conflicting ways of think-
ing about data protection and the role of consent therein. As Bennett and Raab 
have shown, these different ways of meaning making, in turn, lead to different 
(interpretations of) the legal framework and regulatory options. Discourse analy-
sis goes further than a literature review that merely summarizes the arguments 
made: It aims at explicitly identifying the worldviews and assumptions underpin-
ning those arguments. I consider those underpinnings an important part of the 
consent paradox, since they can help to explain why certain views of consent 
persist while others are rejected or, at least, less prominent. 
Since discourse analysis does not prescribe a specific method to identify dis-
courses in the research material, I employed grounded theory, a framework for quali-
tative data analysis. Grounded theory aims at deriving a “theory” from a recur-
sive interpretation of data (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 12). In this context, “theo-
ry” means abstracting underlying concepts “that can be used to explain or pre-
dict phenomena” (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 44). As others have shown, ground-
ed theory ties in well with discourse analysis since both share the aim of discov-
ering explanations that are not manifest in the data (see Keller 2005, 237). In the 
case of texts, this means that reading and summarizing them is not enough: they 
                                                     
13 Bennett and Raab’s (2003) work is not the only exception. I refer to other recent works on data 
protection’s discourses in the conclusion. 
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need to be interpreted instead. Grounded theory provides the tools for such an 
interpretation. It allows for “reading between the lines” in a controlled manner.14 
Thus, I consider grounded theory a helpful tool to identify the discourses shap-
ing the consent paradox. 
Grounded theory is based on a multi-staged interpretation process. It begins 
with “breaking down” the data “into discrete parts”, that is, single words and 
sentences (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 102). These parts are examined, shedding 
light on specific terms and connections that remain invisible in the usual ap-
proach of reading and summarizing. From these newly discovered meanings, 
hypotheses for interpretation are developed and tested against the material. This 
recursive process is supported by techniques such as asking generative questions 
(who, what, why, how), making comparisons in the data, and placing the data 
into categories and sub-categories. The aim of grounded theory is to “open up 
the text” (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 102) in order to develop ideas about underly-
ing concepts, refine them in the light of the material, and test them against old 
and newly added material. The goal of this exercise is to “reassemble” the mate-
rial in a new and illuminating way (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 102). New texts are 
added until a point of saturation has been reached, which means that nothing 
new is brought to the fore by adding more material (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 
214). In my case, I reached this point after interpreting 27 texts. To organize the 
interpretation process, I used the qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA, 
which makes it possible to visualize and perform the procedure of assigning at-
tributes to text segments, referred to as “coding” in qualitative and interpretative 
research (Saldaña 2009, 3). As findings from interpretative research and dis-
course analysis take the form of narratives and rationales, they cannot be pre-
sented as graphs and numbers. They are usually presented first as a comprehen-
sive, evidence-rich analysis, allowing the reader to clearly understand the inter-
pretation derived from the material (see Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 113). 
As I will discuss in the following, I was able to reconstruct two different dis-
courses on consent from the material: the world of data protection rules and the data 
market world15. These two discourses correspond to the two major critiques of 
consent: freely given and informed consent. Furthermore, I argue that my findings 
complement the literature review in section 2. First, they provide a more nu-
anced understanding of the technical details of the consent debate and the rela-
tionship between freely given and informed consent. Second, and at the same 
time, they provide a broader picture by linking the technical arguments to broad-
er societal discourses, thus explaining their influence (or their lack thereof). 
                                                     
14 However, interpretative studies do not and cannot aspire to the same goals and evaluative stand-
ards as positivist research (see Haverland and Yanow 2012). 
15 The term “world” is widely used in constructivist social science to foreground the fact that dis-
courses produce different “realities” (see Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 125). In the following, I 
use the term interchangeably with discourse. 
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4 The Two Worlds of Consent in Data Protection 
In the following I discuss the two predominant discourses of consent that I have 
identified among German data protection professionals: the world of data protection 
rules and the data market world.16 I use these terms as a kind of shorthand to dis-
tinguish the two most common ways of discussing consent in data protection 
among German data protection specialists. I introduce both worlds in their own 
words—to the extent possible in an English-speaking publication drawing on 
German texts. Presenting both worlds in their own language allows the reader to 
grasp each one’s own reality (see Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 153). For exam-
ple, whereas the data market appears as profit-driven to the critical observer, it 
produces mutual benefits from its own perspective.17 I argue that each world’s 
stance on consent depends on these kinds of narratives, which makes it im-
portant to present each in its own right. 
I distinguish both worlds based on their different (1) understanding of data 
protection’s aims and rationales, (2) their view on the relationships between and 
responsibilities of data controllers and data subjects, and (3) their approach to 
consent in the Internet age. In accordance with my methodology, these catego-
ries emerged from the interpretation process. Consequently, the material also 
revealed which text and which author belongs to which camp. Discourse theory, 
however, assumes that discourses reach beyond their authors, embodying broad-
er worldviews that authors make use of and modify but do not create on their 
own (see Fischer and Gottweis 2012, 11). Thus, while referring to specific texts, 
I foreground the competing ideas and worldviews on consent and data protec-
tion instead of their authors. These discursive patterns, I argue, can provide in-
sights beyond the specificities of the German case. The main tenets of each 
world are summarized in table 1. 
 
4.1 The World of Data Protection Rules 
The first discourse I identified in the German consent debate is the world of data 
protection rules. The world of data protection rules emphasizes informational self-
determination as its higher aim (Menzel 2008; Schaar 2001; Iraschko-Luscher 
2006), but in a relatively formalistic manner that does not explain well the ra-
tionale behind this camp’s stance on data protection and consent. The world of 
data protection rules’ way of thinking and arguing can be characterized more 
accurately as a bureaucratic or regulatory one.18 It is concerned with the rigorous 
application of a hierarchical set of rules, instruments, and criteria. It values rules 
                                                     
16 In my master’s thesis, I made a more fine-grained distinction of discourses on consent, resulting 
in four different worlds. For this paper, I reduced complexity by leaving out one discourse and 
merging two others. This also explains why, in the following, I do not cite all 27 texts analyzed. 
17 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for the question that led to this clarification.  
18 I thank Kjetil Rommetveit who suggested these terms to me. 
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that are “explicit”19, “comprehensive”, and “precise” (see Schaar 2001; Roßnagel, 
Pfitzmann, and Garstka 2001, 91; Zscherpe 2004). Adhering to the logic of func-
tionality, data protection rules are both means and ends. Consent is “good right 
and just” when it fulfills the criteria laid out in data protection rules. This is a 
challenging task because, as one author has noted, “a number of substantial, 
formal and other requirements must be met” (Zscherpe 2004, 727). These re-
quirements are set out in general and specific data protection laws20 and elabo-
rated further through the decisions of courts and data protection authorities and 
in legal commentary. In sum, the world of data protection rules understands data 
protection as a complex set of regulations—a machinery that needs to be put to 
work. 21 
In the world of data protection rules, it is the data controller who bears the 
burden of compliance (see Roßnagel, Pfitzmann, and Garstka 2001, 91). Conse-
quently, the world of data protection rules refers to the data controller as the 
verantwortliche Stelle, which literally translates as “responsible authority” (see Iras-
chko-Luscher 2006, 725). The data subject, in turn, is addressed as “affected 
person” (Betroffener). The assumption behind these terms is that controllers’ data 
processing practices can have negative effects on data subjects. More generally, 
the world of data protection rules assumes a certain imbalance between data 
subjects and controllers (Roßnagel, Pfitzmann, and Garstka 2001, 91; Menzel 
2008, 404). Meaningful consent needs to reflect this imbalance. 
The asymmetry between data subjects and controllers is addressed through the 
requirement that any consent must be freely given. While, in fact, all require-
ments for valid consent must be met, it is the issue of freely given consent that 
dominates the world of data protection rules’ discussions. The world of data 
protection rules holds that consent cannot be freely given in situations where the 
data subject is confronted with the “coercive power of the state”, “irresistible 
incentives”, or “legal and factual dependencies” (Roßnagel, Pfitzmann, and 
Garstka 2001, 92). In those instances, the data subject’s decisional autonomy is 
limited. 
German data protection law’s concept of “linkage prohibition” (Koppelungsver-
bot) specifies the requirement of freely given consent in certain situations of fac-
tual dependencies. It forbids that data controllers “depend the conclusion of a 
contract on the consent of the data subject for advertising or for market-
ing/opinion research purposes, when the data subject does not have alternative 
access to comparable contractual services without the consent or such an alterna-
tive is not possible in a reasonable way” (translation by Kosta 2013, 194). In oth-
er words, denying consent for marketing purposes will not lead to a denial of 
                                                     
19 All direct quotations from German sources are my translations. 
20 The laws those texts mainly refer to are the German Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG) and 
the German Telemedia Act (TMG). 
21 This characterization is inspired by Boltanski and Thévenot’s description of an industrial way of 
thinking and acting (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 203). 
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access to a particular service (see Iraschko-Luscher 2006, 709). From this view-
point, freely given consent differs from a contract, in which one party imposes 
certain conditions upon the other. The linkage prohibition thus offers a litmus 
test for assessing whether consent has been freely given. It relies upon the pur-
pose limitation principle as well as an assessment of the data controller’s market 
position.22 The linkage prohibition and its underlying principles are key in under-
standing the world of data protection rules’ critique of consent in the Internet 
age. 
The world of data protection rules holds that the practice of “paying with da-
ta” for online services is difficult to reconcile with the requirement of freely giv-
en consent. Its advocates arrive at this conclusion based on the ideas expressed 
in the linkage prohibition. First, they argue that consent in the context of infor-
mation society services (Telemediendienste) need to be assessed by asking whether 
their users can access the service without consenting to the usage of data for 
advertising purposes. A second and related, question is whether there are alterna-
tives that fulfill this criterion (see Schaar 2001, 648; Menzel 2008, 405). Since 
major online services or platforms do not offer this possibility or can be consid-
ered monopolies (see Kutscha 2010, 113), the linkage prohibition is often violat-
ed. Thus, there are very few situations where consent can be deemed freely giv-
en: only those in which consent and contract have been unbundled from each 
other (Kamp and Rost 2013, 82). In the majority of situations, data processing 
must be based on other grounds than consent, such as contracts, sector-specific 
laws, or codes of conduct and certification schemes as a more flexible alternative 
(see Kamp and Rost 2013, 82). Consequently, it is only in those rare situations 
where consent can be considered freely given that the issue of informed consent 
eventually becomes relevant (see Menzel 2008, 408; Körner 2000, 145). 
To summarize, the world of data protection rules calls into question whether 
data protection in the Internet age can continue to rely on consent. However, its 
operationalization of the imbalance between individuals and data controllers 
presents a kind of quiet critique of power, embodying bureaucratic rather than 
fundamental rights-related values. Put differently, consent appears problematic 
for the modest reason that it does not tick the box on freely given consent. The 
world of data protection rules appears rather self-referential, lacking a compelling 
narrative of why power asymmetries endanger freely given consent. 
4.2 The Data Market World 
The second discourse among German data protectionists is the data market world. 
From the data market viewpoint, data protection serves the higher goal of creat-
ing mutual benefits by facilitating the exchange of personal data between data sub-
                                                     
22 Interestingly, the new GDPR introduces a linkage prohibition in its Article 7(4). In contrast to 
the older German linkage prohibition, the provision in the GDPR is not limited to situations of 
using personal data for marketing purposes. 
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jects and controllers. Its advocates claim that data markets present a win-win-
situation, asserting that it is not just companies but also their customers who 
benefit from data driven business models (see Ladeur 2000, 18). The fact that 
data subjects do benefit from the data market becomes visible when observing 
users’ behavior: Users do not refrain from using services, but deliberately give 
their data to benefit from data processing. The data market provides them with a 
number of useful and indispensable services such as social networks (see 
Bräutigam 2012, 635). The principle of “paying with data” has become an ac-
cepted part of users’ lived reality (see Schafft and Ruoff 2006, 499). 
The data market’s thesis is that data protection should be more evidence-based. 
Its advocates call for an empirically informed understanding of modern data 
processing and user behavior. While earlier works mention those new realities in 
a rather anecdotal manner (see Ladeur 2000; Bull 2006), more recent contribu-
tions build their arguments on actual scientific evidence, referring to works on 
the “economics of privacy” (see Pollmann and Kipker 2016; Arnold, Hillebrand, 
and Waldburger 2015b). These insights, whether anecdotal or empirical, need to 
be reflected in data protection law and, in turn, in its operationalization of con-
sent. Articulating this fact-based rationale, the data market world distinguishes 
itself from the world of data protection rules. Some of its earlier contributions, in 
particular those from before 2010, refer directly to the contributions from the 
world of data protection rules (see Bull 2006; Buchner 2010). As one data market 
advocate puts it, the other side, that is, the world of data protection rules, “un-
derstands self-determination as an end in itself” (Bull 2006, 1622). They criticize 
that the world of data protection rules’ understanding of data protection is de-
tached from actual harms and in ignorance of individuals’ deliberate choices to 
decide for themselves on the risks and benefits of data processing. 
The data market world understands data subjects as “customers” (Bull 2006; 
see Schafft and Ruoff 2006). More recent works refer to data subjects as “users” 
(Arnold, Hillebrand, and Waldburger 2015b; see Pollmann and Kipker 2016). 
The notions of “customer” and “user” suggest a more active role for the data 
subject—compared to the “affected person” in the world of data protection 
rules. Further, the terms imply that data subjects have commercial interests 
reaching beyond the mere expectation of having their data protected. In more 
technical terms, the data market world argues that the right to informational self-
determination includes the idea of granting data subjects a commercial interest 
and, going even further, a certain leverage in commercializing their personal data 
(see Bräutigam 2012, 639). The German general right to personality has been 
increasingly interpreted in favor of a commercialization of the personality (see 
Buchner 2010, 43). Since the right to informational self-determination is also 
based on the right to personality, it is “only a small step” (Bräutigam 2012, 639) 
from understanding the commercial exchange of personal data as an expression 
of informational self-determination. Against this backdrop, consent is considered 
not only a suitable, but also a central instrument for enabling transactions of 
personal data (see Buchner 2010, 43). What sets the data market world’s under-
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standing of consent apart from the world of data protection rules is that the con-
cepts of consent and contract do not differ but converge (Bräutigam 2012, 640). 
In contrast to what its critics might assume, the data market world does not 
deny a certain imbalance between both parties (see Bräutigam 2012, 639). Yet, it 
would be a mistake to jump to “paternalistic” conclusions (see Bräutigam 2012, 
637). Data protection should not protect users against themselves (Schafft and 
Ruoff 2006, 499). The imbalance between data subjects and controllers is not 
ultimately harmful. Quite the contrary, most commercial data processing is 
harmless and, in fact, often beneficial to the data subject (see already Ladeur 
2000, 18). However, to be able to weigh the risks and benefits, the user needs to 
be informed about the modalities of the transaction. Most importantly, it must 
be made clear to the user that the service is not free to her but that she is, in fact, 
paying with her data (Buchner 2016, 159, 2010, 41). In short, the data market 
world highlights the problem of information asymmetries and the requirement of 
redressing them through the requirement of informed consent. 
Yet, the data market world does not entirely dispense with the requirement of 
freely given consent and the related concept of linkage prohibition. In my analy-
sis, I observed two ways how its proponents deal with the issue of freely given 
consent. The first one is to reinterpret what “freely given” means. Some authors 
propose to reserve the notion of freely given consent, and thus the linkage pro-
hibition, for those situations where the data controller is a public authority, an 
employer (Buchner 2016, 158) or where there is a “coercive” dependency, as in 
the case of banking or insurance contracts (Schafft and Ruoff 2006, 504). Infor-
mation society services, in contrast, should not by default be subject to the link-
age prohibition (see already von Lewinski 2002, 399). In most cases, freely given 
consent can be incorporated into the requirement for informed consent instead: 
“A person who is not informed cannot assess the implications of its decision and 
thus is not giving consent freely.” (Petri 2007, 156). Yet, this positioning remains 
largely unexplained. The implicit assumption seems to be that a strict application 
of the linkage prohibition is “removed from reality”, since the linkage prohibi-
tion forbids what is considered the “life blood” (Bräutigam 2012, 637) of the 
relationship between users and Internet platforms: the further processing of per-
sonal data in exchange for using a service. The second way in which the world of 
the data market deals with the issue of freely given consent is by omitting it, fo-
cusing on the informedness of consent instead. This development is evidenced 
by the introduction of the term “informed consent” into the German debate 
(Beisenherz and Tinnefeld 2011; see Pollmann and Kipker 2016; Arnold, Hille-
brand, and Waldburger 2015b). Along with it comes a burgeoning literature on 
how to improve informed consent, ensuring that data subjects read and under-
stand privacy policies and decide in their best interest (see Arnold, Hillebrand, 
and Waldburger 2015a). The concrete measures that are discussed concern the 
idea to simplify privacy policies into “one pagers” and privacy icons (Pollmann 
and Kipker 2016). Another related discussion concerns the idea of improving 
young peoples’ data protection literacy (Caspar 2013, 769). Finally, technical 
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means to support users’ informed consent are discussed in this context (see al-
ready Ladeur 2000, 19).23 While those two options of sidestepping the issue of 
freely given consent appear rather separate from each other, they have at least 
two things in common. First, they embody an evidence-based approach to data 
protection, drawing on insights into users’ everyday reality. Second, although 
appearing grounded in facts rather than norms, both options reify the normative 
value of user choice and thus consent. 
In sum, for the data market world, the question is not whether but how con-
sent can be implemented within data protection. Presenting itself as a fact-based 
and pragmatic way of reasoning, the data market world does not give the impres-
sion of being ideologically charged. Its aims and rationale lead the data market 
world to a reformist problematization of consent. Speaking of reforms, the data 
market world is quite specific when it comes to improving the informedness of 
consent. However, its advocates remain rather vague on other important ques-
tions, such as what the concrete implications of a more contractual understand-
ing of consent are. 
Table 1. Discourses on consent among German data protectionists between 2000 and 2017.  
 World of data protec-
tion rules 
Data market world 
Higher aim of data 
protection 
Right to informational 
self-determination 






spondence with reality) 
Relations between 
data subjects and data 
controllers 
Power asymmetry Information asymmetry 
Operationalization of 
consent 
Freely given consent  
Consent ≠ contract 
Linkage prohibition 
Informed consent 
Consent ~ contract 
Ensuring informed 
choice 
Future of consent Uncertain (whether) Reformist (how)  
Emblematic texts (Menzel 2008; Roßnagel, 
Pfitzmann, and Garstka 
2001; Schaar 2001; 
Zscherpe 2004; Irasch-
ko-Luscher 2006; 
Kutscha 2010; Kamp 
and Rost 2013) 
(Buchner 2016; Bräuti-
gam 2012; Schafft and 
Ruoff 2006; Ladeur 
2000; von Lewinski 
2002; Bull 2006; Arnold, 
Hillebrand, and Wald-
burger 2015b; Pollmann 
and Kipker 2016) 
                                                     
23 The latter examples are not confined to the discussion on ensuring informed consent. 
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5 Discussion and Conclusion: Data Protection as a 
Critique of Power 
In this paper, I have set out to account for the consent paradox, that is, the promi-
nent role ascribed to consent in data protection despite its numerous critiques. 
To elucidate the consent paradox, I first reviewed the scholarly critiques of con-
sent. I showed that critiquing consent in terms of information asymmetries con-
firms rather than calls into question the prominent role of consent and thus re-
produces the consent paradox. A problematization of consent based on power 
asymmetries, in contrast, provides a more substantive critique of consent, casting 
doubts on the centrality of consent in data protection. Yet, the literature review 
appeared too broad and too narrow at the same time. On the one hand, it did 
not tell us much about the legal technical consequences of the respective argu-
ments. On the other hand, the literature review could not account for the fact 
that criticizing consent in terms of information asymmetries is more common 
than problematizing consent in the language of power asymmetries. To address 
these gaps, I supplemented the literature review by conducting a discourse analy-
sis of the debate on consent among German data protection professionals, dis-
tinguishing two common ways of discussing consent. Problematizing consent in 
terms of power asymmetries is linked to the discourse of data protection rules, 
which stresses data subjects’ dependence on digital platforms, and for that rea-
son, calls into question whether data protection can continue to rely on consent. 
It, however, fails to provide a coherent narrative articulating why power asym-
metries are problematic. The fact that consent, when given in situations of factu-
al dependency, might result in non-compliance with data protection law, does 
not present a particularly powerful narrative. Highlighting information asymme-
tries, in contrast, is linked to the popular and intuitive narrative of the data mar-
ket. The data market discourse is supported by an evidence-based approach of 
reasoning. On the data market, consumers exchange “their data” in order to 
benefit from the services provided by internet companies. As a last word of cau-
tion, the worlds of data protection rules and the data market represent ideal types: 
They are scientific constructs to make sense of a more complex reality. They 
neither explain all aspects of the consent debate, nor necessarily correspond to 
the intentions of the actors therein. For example, conducting a research project 
that improves the informedness of consent does not necessitate the researcher to 
be convinced or even aware of the data market discourse.24 
Among scholars it is conventional wisdom that the meaning of data protec-
tion is far from settled (see Lynskey 2015, 272) and maybe even “impossible to 
define” (see Bellanova 2017, 330). Yet, the search for data protection’s meaning 
goes beyond the realm of data protection law. It is also influenced by wider soci-
etal discourses and conflicts. My discussion of the consent paradox speaks to an 
                                                     
24 Matzner et al. make the same point in the context of the German “DIY data protection dis-
course” (Matzner et al. 2016, 289). 
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emerging strand of literature exploring how political, scientific and popular dis-
courses shape the field of data protection (Matzner et al. 2016; Draper 2017; 
Hull 2015; Bellanova 2014; van Dijk, Gellert, and Rommetveit 2016). Quite a 
few of those works come to similar conclusions: They observe an increasing 
individualization and commodification of data protection (Matzner et al. 2016; 
Draper 2017; Hull 2015; Crain 2016). It is tempting to dismiss these studies as 
broad and undifferentiated attempts to explain developments in data protection 
as influenced by a neoliberal zeitgeist. In fact, these studies paint a more nuanced 
picture, attempting to show (1) how data protection oscillates between different 
aims and understandings, most notably the free flow of data and the protection 
of individuals (see Bellanova 2017, 336), (2) how these understandings translate 
into laws and instruments and vice versa (see Draper 2017), and (3) how the field 
and its perceptions change over time (see van der Sloot 2014). Yet, further re-
search is needed on all three points. 
Looking at the case of the consent paradox, future work needs to retrace in 
more detail how the world of data protection rules, the data market world, or 
varieties of those discourses shape the interpretation of freely given and in-
formed consent in practice, especially under the new GDPR. The EU’s new data 
protection rules leave room for interpretation on these points, especially in their 
take on the linkage prohibition in article 7(4) and recital 43. In this analysis, I 
have suggested that freely given consent could be incorporated into the require-
ment of informedness, thus redefining power asymmetries as information 
asymmetries. Another possibility that is more in line with the world of data pro-
tection rules is a strong take on the linkage prohibition. This, in turn, could re-
duce the omnipresence of consent in practice, leading data controllers to rely on 
other legal grounds, most importantly contracts. However, this might only shift 
the discussion over take-it-or-leave-it choices from the legal ground of consent 
to that of contracts (see Rhoen 2016, 7).25 Another research gap left by my study 
concerns the development of the consent debate and its underlying discourses 
over time. Due to its research design, my paper does not account for this dia-
chronic perspective in a representative manner. It only allows for the tentative 
hypothesis that the data market discourse has become more dominant in recent 
years. 
What are the practical consequences of my findings? Asking this question im-
plies that I consider the “consent paradox” not only an empirical phenomenon 
but also as a political problem. The consent paradox is problematic since it dis-
courages more comprehensive critiques on the limits of consent and thus hinders 
more substantial reforms to consent. As others have proposed, meaningful re-
forms of consent should include reducing the burden on consent by regulating 
what kind of processing practices can be subject to individual choice in the first 
                                                     
25 During the finalization phase of this article, the discussion on how to deal with the linkage pro-
hibition and take-it-or-leave-it choices in the GDPR has just begun (Borgesius et al. 2017; Arti-
cle 29 Data Protection Working Party 2017). 
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place (see Gellert and Gutwirth 2013, 527). The omnipresence of consent also 
limits our ability to think beyond consent, tying up resources needed to advance 
in other issue areas of data protection such as organizational and enforcement 
measures (see Zanfir 2014). Finally, the consent paradox and its underlying mar-
ket discourse risks omitting the collective values of data protection and privacy 
(see Hull 2015, 94). My analysis suggests that a break with the consent paradox 
can only be achieved by reintroducing a more compelling critique of power into 
data protection than the rule-oriented and bureaucratic data protection discourse 
is able to articulate. As others have argued, the early justifications of data protec-
tion with their focus on holding the powerful accountable might be instructive 
for this purpose (van der Sloot 2014; Rauhofer 2013). Articulating data protec-
tion as a critique of power necessitates us to make clear how power and data 
processing relate to each other, what are the risks associated with it, and conse-
quently, what should be the ends and means of data protection. 
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